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In 2020, euro area GDP shrank by 6.7%, almost double the 
decline observed in the United States (3.5%). This relatively 
poorer behaviour of economic activity in the euro area 
reflected not only the deeper economic impact of the first 
wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, but also the fall-off in 
activity in the euro area in the final stretch of last year (and in 
early 2021) with the successive waves of the virus. This 
downturn was not observed in the United States (see Chart 1). 
Moreover, most analysts’ forecasts also predict a swifter 
exit from the crisis in the United States than in the euro 
area, a typical feature of the recoveries from previous 
recessionary episodes (see Chart 2). Thus, according to 
the European Commission’s spring forecasts,1 while the 
United States would exceed its pre-crisis GDP level by 
mid-2021, this would not occur in the euro area until early 
2022. 
This early-release box was published on 1 June
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1  See European Commission (2021), Spring 2021 Economic Forecast: Rolling up sleeves.
SOURCES: European Commission, Fred, Google Mobility Report, John Hopkins University and Banco de España.
a Includes four recessions: 1975 Q1, 1980 Q3, 1993 Q1 (1991 Q1 for the United States) and 2009 Q2.
b Quarterly average of daily data on an average index of mobility at grocery and pharmacy stores, retail and recreation centres, workplaces and transit 
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This box sets out some of the factors that might account 
for this economic disparity since the onset of the 
pandemic, paying particular attention to specific aspects 
of the health crisis.
Firstly, it is worth stressing that, since the start of the 
pandemic, the restrictions applied to contain the 
expansion of the virus have been less stringent in the 
United States than in the euro area. Although this has 
prompted more unfavourable epidemiological developments 
in the US economy (see Chart 3),2 one consequence has 
been a lesser reduction in mobility in the United States. 
Thus, for instance, in 2020 as a whole, the decline in 
mobility in the United States was 16%, compared with 
20% in the euro area (see Chart 4).3 As Chart 5 shows, 
these differences in the behaviour of mobility – essentially 
associated with the differing severity of the lockdown 
measures in each region – help account for around 1 pp of 
the greater economic impact of the health crisis in the 
euro area.4 Mobility, therefore, is a significant but 
insufficient factor to fully explain the differential economic 
impact of the crisis in 2020 in both regions. Moreover, the 
different share in each region of the services sectors most 
affected in this crisis does not appear to be a key factor 
for explaining these differences. This is because these 
services generally display a relatively similar weight in 
these economies.5 Consequently, the conceptual 
framework used in this analysis would suggest the 
presence of other differential factors between the United 
States and the euro area that are not reflected in the 
variables considered. 
In this respect, one factor not included in the 
aforementioned analysis and which might, at least partly, 
account for the bigger average decline in GDP in 2020 in 
the euro area, is this region’s greater trade openness and, 
in conjunction, the bigger relative share in its productive 
structure of manufacturing (16% of GVA compared with 
11% in the United States). In 2020 H1, the decline in 
manufacturing activity totalled 20% in the euro area, set 
against 13% in the United States (see Chart 6). Such 
activity was affected not only by the stricter lockdowns 
across Europe, but also by the severely distorted 
international trade flows during the first stage of the 
pandemic.6 However, while the subsequent pick-up in 
manufacturing has been significant, its sharp initial 
contraction is estimated to have contributed notably to 
explaining the decline in activity in 2020 as a whole. 
In addition, some of the more favourable economic 
developments in the US may be the result of the impetus 
from economic policies. For instance, while the central 
banks’ monetary policy response in the euro area and in 
the United States was admittedly swift and forceful 
(ensuring favourable financing conditions and, in the case 
of the euro area, preventing financial fragmentation), in 
the United States the lowering of the policy interest rates 
from 1.50-1.75% at the onset of the health crisis to 
0-0.25% seems to have provided a further stimulus. 
Comparing the fiscal policy response is a complex task7 
because of, among other reasons, the particular features 
of the measures approved, the distinct role of the 
automatic stabilisers in each region and the fact that a 
significant portion of the euro area’s support has been 
channelled through public guarantees, which do not have 
an immediate direct impact on the budget deficit. In any 
event, the usual measurements for quantifying fiscal 
impulse − depicted in Chart 7, drawing on data from the 
IMF’s April 2021 Fiscal Monitor − indicate that to date it 
2  See Box 1.1, “Global epidemiological developments”, Chapter 1, Annual Report 2020, Banco de España.
3  To date in 2021, the fact that the US vaccination campaign has moved ahead appreciably more rapidly than in the euro area has prompted these 
differences to widen even further.
4  Regression for 27 EU countries and the United Kingdom. The impact of the crisis on 2020 GDP is accounted for by mobility variables, the share of the 
sectors most affected by the crisis and working from home (specifically, the number of employees who began to work from home as a consequence 
of the pandemic, according to the Eurofound Survey (2020), Living, working and COVID-19 dataset, Dublin). All variables expressed in differences with 
respect to the United States. The approach by A. L. Gómez and A. del Río (2021) in “La crisis sanitaria y el impacto inicial desigual sobre las economías 
del área del euro”, Documento Ocasional, Banco de España, forthcoming, is followed. For similar evidence, see IMF (2021), Differences in Output 
Performance between Europe and the United States during COVID-19, Online Annex, Regional Economic Outlook Update Europe.
5  The services sectors comprising accommodation services and restaurants, artistic and recreational activities, and other services account for around 
6% of GVA in the United States and the euro area. At a greater level of aggregation, retail, transport and hospitality, and artistic, recreational and other 
services have a share of 22% of GVA in the euro area, only marginally higher than the figure for the United States (21%).
6  See Box 2.2, “Global trade flows against the background of the pandemic”, Chapter 2, Annual Report 2020, Banco de España.
7  See Box 2, “Fiscal policy response to the crisis in the euro area and the United States”, “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 
4/2020, Banco de España.
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appears to have been somewhat larger in the United 
States. Looking ahead, both areas are considering a 
further significant fiscal impulse,8 with investment, 
particularly that related to combating climate change, 
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat, IMF and Banco de España.
a Cross-sectional regression weighted by the size of GDP for the 27 European Union Member States and the United Kingdom. The economic impact 
is measured as the difference between the change in GDP observed in 2020 and the change forecast before the health crisis, taking into account the 
European Commission’s January 2020 forecasts for all the countries except for the United States, which are drawn from the IMF’s January forecasts. 
All the variables are expressed as differences vis-à-vis the United States.
b “Euro area” includes the NGEU programme and “United States” includes the plans approved in December 2020 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2021) and March 2021 (American Rescue Plan).
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8  See Box 3, “Analysis of US fiscal policy plans”, “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2021, Banco de España.
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taking centre stage. In the United States these measures 
will materialise in the as yet unapproved American Jobs 
Plan and American Family Plan, the latter more focused 
on transfers to households, whereas in the euro area the 
stimulus will take the form of the Next Generation 
EU (NGEU) programme. The NGEU funds will complement 
those deployed in the Member States’ national plans.9 
Lastly, the fact that, in recent months, vaccination of the 
population has progressed more swiftly in the United 
States than in the euro area would also help explain why 
the US economy has been performing better. In this 
regard, by using the quantitative framework for analysing 
interactions between epidemiological developments, 
mobility restrictions and economic performance proposed 
by Rungcharoenkitkul (2021),10 it is possible to assess the 
impact that a vaccination strategy similar to that of the 
United States would have had on GDP in the euro 
area.  Specifically, Chart 8 considers a counterfactual 
(hypothetical) scenario in which the vaccinated population 
in the euro area would have reached 29% of the total 
population at the end of Q1 − rather than the 12% 
observed − and in which the EU target of vaccinating 70% 
of the adult population would be achieved at the beginning 
of July (instead of before the end of the summer, as 
envisaged in the EU’s current strategy).11 The economic 
effects of this alternative vaccination scenario would 
mostly arise in 2021 Q1 and the beginning of Q2, when 
the drop in mortality stemming from a faster vaccination 
strategy would have enabled the lockdown measures to 
have been eased earlier. Indeed, these more favourable 
epidemiological developments would have prevented the 
slowdown in economic activity observed in the euro area 
in 2021 Q1 and enabled somewhat greater growth in Q2. 
In terms of the year as a whole, this would result in euro 
area GDP in 2021 being on average 0.7 pp higher.
In short, the economic crisis induced by the COVID-19 
pandemic has been less acute in the United States than in 
the euro area, and the US economy is also expected to 
recover more quickly. The evidence presented in this box 
suggests that these differences may be partly explained 
by the role of public policies, in terms of containing the 
pandemic and at the economic level, and by other 
structural factors related to the euro area’s greater 
sensitivity to developments in world trade (which was hit 
hard in 2020 H1) and to the greater flexibility that the US 
economy has historically shown.
 9  See Box 2.3, “NGEU: an initiative bolstering the EU project”, Chapter 2, Annual Report 2020, Banco de España.
10  See P. Rungcharoenkitkul (2021), “Macroeconomic consequences of pandexit”, Working Papers, No 932, Bank for International Settlements.
11  See Communication from the Commission of 19 January 2021, “A united front to beat COVID-19”.
